The advent of globalization and liberalization has brought a critical mindfulness towards enhancing the engaged policies in making economies, for instance, India. As of not very far in the past, most of the emerging countries have worked without a coordinated competition regulation, and have legitimized the interventions by the State over economic attributes. The Indian Competition Law has been taken from two overwhelming norms – the US Antitrust Law and the EU Competition regulation. It was believed that till 1975, these were the only vital two regulation models accessible; in any case, India had a Sui Generis model of competition regulation in 1969 as Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act. 

India chose Competition regulation that was organized to further develop customer protection through managing the challenges and issues in the smooth conduct of the business. Accordingly, the Law has gone through with the prelude of forestalling business practices affecting competition, in advancing and sustaining healthy competition in the market, in safeguarding the interests of consumers and lastly, to guarantee opportunity of trade among players across different markets, in India, and for issues associated therewith or incidental. The Competition structure directs the players in the market – the don’ts, while sectoral regulators act on the inverse and teach market specialists – the dos. The differentiations in the procedures and ways of managing competition matters might bring about fluctuating outcomes, in a way creating turmoil for stakeholders.

Since the concept of competition law and sectoral controllers reflect varying assumptions about government intercession into the market activities, justifying their effect on industry behavior is frequently troublesome. The competition regulations are agonizing omnipresence, with unavoidable, practically construed importance in our statute. Sectoral regulators might displace the competition regulator and explicit industries for reaping and tampering competition. However, at the edges, the essential purposes svelte out and the anti-trust regulations govern in the hindsight. At this stage, it is very difficult to merge the policies contrasting into standard rigid regulation preserves the distinct values of both.